Why does parliament scrutinise the government

The essence of this provision, read in conjunction with the succeeding provisions, is in the words of Quick and Garran :. Although there is no constitutional restriction on who shall be appointed to the Executive Council, it has been composed, with a few exceptions, of Ministers of State. Second section 63 —The provisions of the Constitution referring to the Governor-General in Council are to be construed as referring to the Governor-General acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.

This section makes it mandatory, as a constitutional principle, that in such matters the Governor-General acts only with the advice of the Federal Executive Council which, by virtue of section 64, and by convention, is the Ministry. The import of this section is to give further constitutional recognition to the concept of responsible government. Third section 64 —The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer such Departments of State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may establish.

Such officers hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General. Section 64 further provides that after the first general election no Minister of State can hold office for a longer period than three months unless he or she is or becomes a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives. This section provides the constitutional authority for the appointment of Ministers and determines that the Ministry, for all intents and purposes, forms the Executive Government of the Commonwealth.

The requirement that Ministers must eventually sit in Parliament brings together the executive and legislative organs of government. Fourth sections 65—67 —The Constitution gives further recognition to the Ministry by empowering the Parliament to determine the number of Ministers and the offices they shall hold [19] see page 58 and the salaries they are to be paid see page The Executive Government in the broader sense is not only composed of the Ministry.

The Constitution also makes provision, until the Parliament otherwise provides, for the appointment and removal of other officers of the Executive Government by the Governor-General in Council.

These conventions are numerous, and in some cases there is no universal agreement that they exist. Conventions are based on established precedent and practice and in many respects have their foundation in British law and practice established before They are subject to change by way of political interpretation or political circumstances and may in some instances be broken.

Constitutional conventions are of great significance in the exercise of the reserve powers of the Crown. This is particularly evident in the exercise of the power of dissolution, [21] vested by the Constitution solely in the Governor-General but not normally exercised without regard to convention. The workings of responsible government, the concept of ministerial responsibility collective and individual and the existence of Cabinet not mentioned in the Constitution are for all practical purposes the subject of constitutional convention.

The Constitution made no mention of political parties until when section 15, relating to the filling of casual vacancies in the Senate, was amended. The last official data in showed approximately MPs affected. Unofficial estimates of the size of the payroll vote suggest that by it was equivalent to well over a third of government MPs.

Given the smallish number of Conservative MPs in the and Parliaments, the ratio will still be high. When Commons seats fall to , the prominence of the payroll vote will increase, unless government roles for MPs are cut back. Sources: Who Runs Britain? The coalition period marked not just a period of record dissenting votes by backbenchers against their party line, but also the extension of this behaviour to larger and more consequential issues.

Public confidence in Parliament was very badly damaged by the expenses scandals of , and trust in the House of Commons remains at a low ebb, despite some worthwhile but modest reforms in the interim, which made Select Committees more effective in scrutinising government. The Commons remains a potent focus for national debate — but that would be true of any legislature in most mature liberal democracies.

There is no evidence that the UK legislature is especially effective or well-regarded, as its advocates often claim. Five years of Coalition government somewhat reduced executive predominance over Parliament — as they were almost bound to do — and the return of a hung Parliament in may do so again. But even this recurrence may not break traditions of strong executive control over the Commons.

After , there were some signs of an amelioration of party discipline and more cross-party working being possible, but they may still be temporary.

Structural reforms to make the Commons a more effective legislature, and to modernise ritualistic behaviours and processes, are still urgently needed. Note: this was originally published on Democratic Audit.

Your email address will not be published. Notify me of follow-up comments by email. Notify me of new posts by email. Search for:. How effective is Parliament in controlling UK government and representing citizens? The elected legislature should normally maintain full public control of government services and state operations, ensuring public and Parliamentary accountability through conditionally supporting the government, and articulating reasoned opposition, via its proceedings.

In the preparation of new laws, the legislature should supervise government consultations and help ensure effective pre-legislative scrutiny. In considering legislation Parliament should undertake close scrutiny in a climate of effective deliberation, seeking to identify and maximise a national consensus where feasible.

Legislators should regularly and influentially scrutinise the current implementation of policies, and audit the efficiency and effectiveness of government services and policy delivery. Recent developments The first peacetime coalition since between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats marked out as an unusual period of Parliamentary relations with the government.

Party cohesion has weakened, but is still exceptionally high by cross-national standards. Committee scrutiny of legislation via partisan whipped bill committees with inexpert MPs is always ritualistic, ineffective and normally of very little value. Finance debates are simply political and general talk-fests for the government and opposition. The top two parties are not only normally over-represented in terms of MPs vis-a-vis their vote share, but also collude to run Westminster business as a club in their partisan interests e.

The views of smaller parties and parties left unrepresented despite substantial vote shares are systematically excluded from Parliament. Blog blog Despatch Box Blog. News news News Home. Events events Events. Journal journal Parliamentary Affairs. Coronavirus Act renewal: Into the sunset? Canadian conflict over contempt of Parliament and national security creates constitutional conundrum. Financial Scrutiny: the Finance Bill.

Financial Scrutiny: the Budget. Show filters. Sort by:. Parliament must therefore have the structures and processes in place to effectively perform legislative scrutiny. The scope of this report is limited to the process of legislative scrutiny in the House of Commons, which has long been criticised. Particularly the committee stage of scrutiny, which is intended to prepare the plenary for debate.

Committee systems enable parliaments to economise time and resource through specialisation and preparation of the full chamber for deliberation and debate. Committees are typically considered effective when they are permanent and specialised, have a high degree of independence, are small in size and can draw on expert support staff. Contrary to this House of Commons public bill committees, which scrutinise bills before Parliament, are ad hoc.

Furthermore, the temporary nature of these committees hinders relationship building between committee members, hampering the development of a collaborative and deliberative approach to scrutiny. Public bill committees also lack independence. They are criticised for being excessively partisan, leading to an adversarial culture aimed at party political point scoring rather than improvement of the bill at hand.

The partisan obstructionism results from the strong control exercised by the whips and the executive over membership and timetabling. This report recommends that departmental select committees, which since have gained a reputation for independence and effective scrutiny, be entrusted with legislative scrutiny functions and thereby become dual-purpose committees. Not only would legislative scrutiny benefit from the independence and subject expertise of select committees, dual-purpose committees would ensure that legislative scrutiny benefits from the expertise gained by select committees through inquiries, and that general oversight by select committees gains from insights gathered during legislative scrutiny.

Recent years have seen an explosion in the use of delegated legislation, which largely escapes parliamentary scrutiny. This report therefore recommends that select committees are given powers to call hearings and propose amendments to statutory instruments laid before Parliament.